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THE HEALTHCARE PRIVACY-ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE IMPASSE
By Charlotte A. Tschider
INTRODUCTION
With the advent of the Internet, wireless technologies, advanced
computing, and, ultimately, the integration of mobile devices into patient
care, medical device technologies have revolutionized the healthcare sector.1
What once was a highly personal, one-to-one relationship between physician
and patient has now been expanded, including medical device
manufacturers, third party healthcare system providers, even physician-as-aservice for interpreting the data complex systems chum out. The introduction
of technology to the healthcare field has, at an ever-increasing rate,
transformed human health management.
I.

THE NEW CONSUMER HEALTH MARKETPLACE

Amongst rising healthcare costs, the easy access of the Internet, and a
cultural desire to self-manage many health concerns, individuals-with the
assistance of consumer electronics-are performing more traditional medical
activities on their own.2 For example, for cancer detection, there are now
several apps that enable an individual to use their smart phone to detect a
high probability of cancer simply by taking a picture of the affected area.3
For example, UMSkinCheckApp is a skin cancer detection app created at the
University of Michigan and available free to the public.4 These apps usually
are run on an artificial intelligence ("Al") infrastructure, commonly being
fitted to power advanced computing applications, like those that can detect
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cancer. In fact, Al in skin cancer diagnosis may actually be better than your
physician at diagnosing skin cancer.5
Due to its tremendous capability for identifying probabilities for
relational data sets, Al has been positioned to solve the most complex of
health challenges. Al can revolutionize at-home care for older adults,
reducing nursing home costs and improving quality of life. 6 Al can improve
diagnostic processes for rural, generalist, or low-resourced doctors, whose
patients may not have access to specialists.7 Al can automate certain
healthcare tasks or low-risk work, freeing busy physicians to focus more
fully on complex cases.8 Al can enable greater quality of life by untethering
patients from chronic, time-consuming, and low-compliance tasks, such as
managing diabetes.9
II.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SOLVES HEALTH PROBLEMS AND
CREATES NEW TENSIONS

The root of all of these Al promises, however, is data. Al lives and dies
based on the data supplied to it. This means that Al, to deliver effectively on
these promises, must be continuously provided high-quality, broad data
sets.1" It likely also means that probabilistic relationships between these data
and Al functionality must be tested on an ongoing basis to harness the selflearning capability of unlocked machine learning, neural network, and deep
learning applications.1
One point of significant challenge is the tension between Al data needs,
which are both significant and often unknown at the time of collection, and
individual data protection concerns. Although this short article will focus on
privacy considerations, data protection reflects both individual privacy and
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the protection of personal information, as in cybersecurity where there are
significant safety concerns for Al systems. 12 The reality is that Al
technology safety and reliability goals complicate or frustrate data protection
core elements. The nature of data storage and system infrastructure for Al
application in healthcare creates a host of other challenges related to data
protection.
III.

PRIVACY GOALS AT CROSS-PURPOSES wiTH Al

In information privacy, a number of key tenets have emerged from at
least 20 years of active development in the international statutory space. Not
only does the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
in the United States mandate certain required steps with relation to Protected
Health Information (PHI), a type of personal information statutorily defined,
many omnibus international data protection laws similarly require certain
steps be taken (and certain actions restricted) based on the privacy rights of a
natural person.13
First, the most significant principle of privacy law is "data
minimization."1 4 Data minimization is the concept that data should not be
collected, used, or stored more than is absolutely necessary. This concept is
integrated into other traditional privacy concepts like use restrictions. Data
protection laws require a privacy notice be displayed prior to data collection,
and subsequent use of data must be consistent with what has been previously
and specifically disclosed in the notice."1
Al creates major challenges for data minimization in that 1) data
maximization, rather than minimization, is a central success factor for Al, 2)
often Al data scientists do not always know which data elements will be
useful to make a specific decision, and 3) data previously collected can be
tremendously useful for future Al uses. These three problems cannot be
solved under existing HIPAA requirements. First, covered entities
(organizations regulated under HIPAA) must only collect data necessary to
treatment, payment, or healthcare operations.16
For any data collection or use outside these purposes by a covered
entity or a third party of the covered entity, express authorization must be
completed, requiring not only explicit consent from the patient but also an
12
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expiration date or event. 17 This presumes that data use will end. Further, data
uses are restricted to those specifically communicated in the privacy notice
or authorization, restricting downstream or different uses. In Al, often the
nature of data use is not determined before collection because the algorithm
itself determines which data are useful, not the data scientist.
One way around this issue is to remove identifying features of PHI so
that data may be used more flexibly. When data are de-identified under
HIPAA's de-identification safe harbor, data may be used as broadly as one
wishes; even data sales are permitted. 8 However, Al may also be used to reidentify patients from seemingly de-identified data sets. As previously
described, Al functions only when it is supplied a steady stream and volume
of data.
Usually these data are collected in "big data" sets, or large aggregated
databases stored at a cloud provider, a third party that can manage data of
this volume. To fill out the database, frequently organizations will purchase
other de-identified data sets, such as from insurers, or adopt other data sets
that may be publicly available. When these data sets are combined and an Al
utility runs, an individual patient may be reidentified to a significant
probability, effectively undoing de-identification. HIPAA does not address
the challenges of reidentification, only of de-identification.
Finally, data are tremendously useful. Without data, Al systems fail.
This means that healthcare data will become absolutely central to the success
and safety of Al tools, including everything from diagnostic apps to complex
medical devices, like the artificial pancreas. The necessity of data creates
unique challenges for downstream use: 1) data use may be limited in time, 2)
data may be impossible to recollect, due to lack of contact or
reidentifiability, and 3) data are valuable. The underlying function of
historical privacy laws, like HIPAA, is that activities begin and end, rather
than continue and change. For this reason, HIPAA demands that data use
outside primary data collection purposes like treatment, payment, and
healthcare operations, should be limited, explicitly agreed upon, and
terminated upon some date or action.
This perspective is informed by contemplated data uses at the time the
Privacy Rule was finally implemented: in 2002, typically data outside
primary purposes was used for a discrete purpose, such as sending data for a
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second opinion, sending to an outside lab, referring to a third party, or for
other limited purposes. Authorizations were not intended to last forever. If a
time period terminates or data may be desired to be used for another purpose,
it can be impossible or tremendously impractical to "reconsent" to different
data uses or uses beyond the previous authorization's date or terminating
event. For example, if data have been de-identified, they may have a
probability of identification but may not be able to actually be directly
identified where contact information is available. To reconsent, an
organization would need a phone number or e-mail, which are not permitted
as part of a HIPAA safe harbor de-identified data set under most
circumstances. Further, even if such data is available, the data may be out of
the control of the primary party after it has been de-identified.
Perhaps most important is the relative value of such data: without
healthcare data from a variety of sources, Al applications will not be able to
be created, and likely the goals of Al will be frustrated. Healthcare is one of
the areas with the most Al opportunity, and fulfilling these goals means
ready access and likely sharing of such data. Although individual privacy
rights must be observed, this may mean a shift in how we think about
individual privacy.
CONCLUSION
Reworking privacy commitments in an Al world is an important
endeavor. It may mean that we reconceptualize what these rights must be
against a broader data need. It will likely include investment in better
approaches to reduced identifiability that protect patients while promoting
data use and sharing that will not reidentify. It may also mean permitting, at
least for Al, broader declarations in privacy notices that put patients on
notice for the use of Al while also permitting broader use. Without an
approach that balances both invention and patient protection, we cannot
realize the incredible potential of Al in healthcare.

